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Abstract 
Affective habituation is well-documented in social sciences: people seem to 
adapt to many life events, ranging from lottery windfalls to terminal illnesses. 
We propose a subtle but critical difference: current happiness may depend 
directly on past happiness. We test our hypothesis running dynamic happiness 
regressions using panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, the 
British Household Panel Survey and the Swiss Household Panel. Contrary to the 
widespread prior among economists and non-economists, the coefficient on 
lagged happiness is positive and statistically significant. We discuss some 
explanations for the puzzle. Our favorite is that reported happiness is time-
inconsistent, even within individuals. We test this conjecture by using a 52-days 
study. As expected, the coefficient on lagged happiness is negative and 
statistically significant. We find that changes in hedonic states bounce back 30% 
in only 5 days. 
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1. Introduction 
Brickman et al. (1971) coined the term “hedonic treadmill” to describe how people 
tend to adapt to good and bad events and then return to the same baseline level of 
happiness. Since then a number of papers in social sciences suggested that people adapt to 
particular life events, ranging from lottery windfalls (Brickman et al., 1978) to losing a limb to 
cancer (Tyc, 1992). We take a further step and argue that there may be a “general” 
habituation effect: people’s general feeling of happiness may adapt just like the human 
olfactory system adapts to a continuous stimulus, so that the odor becomes unnoticed. 
In other words, having experienced moments of happiness (unhappiness) in the 
present will make people prone to feelings of unhappiness (happiness) in the future, 
regardless of the original increase (decrease) in well-being being due to changes in income, 
health or love partners. Even though the difference between “specific” and “general” 
habituation is a central part in all the theoretical discussion on hedonic adaptation, this is the 
very first paper to address that empirically.1
Even though the differences between “specific habituation” and “general 
habituation” may seem subtle from the theoretical point of view, they are clear from an 
econometrician’s perspective: in a happiness regression the effect of general habituation will 
be captured by the coefficient on lagged happiness, while the effect of income habituation 
will be captured by the coefficient on lagged income. 
 
We test our hypothesis by running dynamic happiness regressions using individual-
level panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, the British Household Panel 
Survey and the Swiss Household Panel.  We propose a variety of models to overcome many 
identification challenges. 
If there is general habituation, then the coefficient on lagged happiness should be 
negative. Contrary to that widespread prior among economists and non-economists, we find 
that the coefficient for lagged happiness is positive and statistically significant. We discuss 
some explanations for the puzzle. 
1 For example, Frederick et al. (1999) use the denomination “specific-domain hedonic adaptation.” And in the 
same spirit Kahneman (2000) distinguishes between the “hedonic treadmill” and the “satisfaction treadmill.” 
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The most likely explanation is the fact that self-report scales may undermine the 
study of happiness dynamics.  We provide a test for this conjecture: happiness scores should 
be much more consistent during a 52-day study rather than during a 20-year study. Indeed, 
when we run the regressions using a daily panel the coefficient on lagged happiness is 
negative and significant. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly explains the difference between 
general and specific adaptation. Section 3 introduces the data and empirical strategy. The 
econometric results are detailed and discussed in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the 
intertemporal consistency of self-reported scores. In Section 6 we fit the model using daily 
data. The final section concludes. 
2. Hedonic adaptation 
There are a numerous studies in social sciences showing that people experience 
hedonic adaptation. We will denominate this theory “specific habituation”: people adapt to 
particular life events, such as an increase in income, losing a job or getting married. 
For instance, Brickman et al. (1978) show that state lottery winners reported only 
slightly higher levels of life satisfaction than a control group. Oswald et al. (2008) provide 
longitudinal evidence that people who become disabled exhibit a 30% to 50% recovery in 
mental well-being. Tyc (1992) found no difference in quality of life between young patients 
who had lost limbs to cancer compared with those who had not. In a study of prisoners, 
Wormith (1984) observed significant improvement in deviance, attitude, and personality 
measures. Some health studies involve burn victims (Patterson et al., 1993) and hemodialysis 
patients (Riis et al., 2005). 
A few economists have shown interest in the measurement of affective habituation. In 
one of the first studies, Di Tella et al. (2007) used panel data on life satisfaction and 
concluded that 65% of the initial effect of an increase in income is lost over the ensuing four 
years. Clark et al. (2008) use panel data to find evidence of adaptation to life events such as 
unemployment, layoffs, marriage, and divorce. For more details about empirical and 
experimental evidence see Frederick et al. (1999). 
3
Some psychologists and economists do agree that, for example, a current increase in 
permanent income has an effect on happiness that only lasts a few years.2
We propose another distinction, which can be tested empirically. In addition to 
habituation in specific life domains, there may be “general habituation” to happiness: having 
experienced moments of happiness (unhappiness) today may make people more prone to 
feelings of unhappiness (happiness) in the future, regardless of the source of the original 
increase (decrease) in well-being. Indeed, Rayo et al. (2005) and Perez Truglia (2009) show 
that from an evolutionary point of view we should expect the hedonic states to bounce back 
to normal levels in this way. 
 However, there 
still is no consent about the actual mechanisms that make such adaptation happen (e.g. 
Kahneman, 2000). For instance, one theory suggests that such adaptation is the result of 
people updating their income aspirations. In other words, as soon as people get what they 
desire, they start desiring something better. Another theory suggests that the intrinsic reward 
centers in our brain adapt automatically. Regardless of our expectations, if you start drinking 
$50 wine bottles instead of $10 bottles, sooner or later the $50 wine will taste like a $15 or 
even $10 wine. 
Nature created a homeostatic system that triggers adaptation whenever upper and 
lower thresholds are achieved. When such thresholds are reached the adaptation 
mechanisms are triggered regardless of whether the marginal change in happiness was the 
result of winning the lottery, getting divorced or being imprisoned.3
Even though the differences between specific habituation and general habituation 
may be subtle from a theoretical point of view, they are very clear from an econometrician’s 
perspective. The effect of specific habituation (e.g. income) will be captured by the 
coefficients on lagged income, while the effect of general habituation will be captured by the 
coefficients on lagged happiness. 
 We believe this effect 
can be represented by autoregressive happiness. 
As a consequence, the effect on happiness from an increase in income will be twofold. 
On the one hand, higher income increases future income aspirations and, ceteris paribus, 
2 In a 2007 policy-views survey of a random sample of members of the American Economic Association less than 
half of the respondents agreed that economic growth in developed countries like the U.S. leads to greater levels of 
happiness (Whaples, 2009). 
3 For instance, Perez Truglia (2009) provides a model to explain the timing of the hedonic adaptation process 
inspired in the case of psychological defenses (e.g. Freud, 1937). 
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decreases future happiness (specific habituation). On the other hand, higher income increases 
present happiness and then makes the individual more prone to feelings of unhappiness 
tomorrow (general habituation). 
Even though there are numerous papers studying specific-habituation, there is not a 
single paper measuring the general-habituation channel (i.e. happiness autoregressivity). We 
will see that it is important. 
3. Econometric Model and Data 
To test our hypothesis empirically, we will make use of the German Socio-Economic 
Panel Study4 (GSOEP), the British Household Panel Survey5 (BHPS) and the Swiss 
Household Panel6
The challenge in estimating a dynamic model with fixed effects is that, for well-
known reasons, it yields inconsistent estimates with large N but short T. The panel lengths 
are 22, 8 and 10 for the GSOEP, SHP and BHPS, respectively.
 (SHP). In what follows we present the regressions results for the GSOEP, 
SHP and BHPS as A, B and C-Tables, respectively. 
7
The baseline linear
 Since the GSOEP is the longest 
and largest panel, we will concentrate the discussion on results obtained form it. 
Nevertheless, results are quite robust between datasets. 
8
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   (1)  
The dependent variable tiH ,  is self reported happiness, tiX ,  is a vector of time 
varying individual controls, Q  and R  are respectively the number of lags to be considered 
for each of the variables, iη  are individual fixed effects, tψ  corresponds to year effects and 
ti,ε  is the error term. If coefficient γ  was negative (positive), then happiness would display 
4 Data was made available to us by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.  
5 University of Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research, British Household Panel Survey: Waves 1-15, 1991-
2006 [computer file]. 3rd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], June 2007. SN: 5151. 
6 Data has been collected in the "Living in Switzerland" project, which is based at the Swiss Foundation for 
Research in Social Sciences FORS, University of Lausanne (a project is financed by the Swiss National Science 
Foundation). 
7 However, there is a gap in the middle of the BHPS for data on happiness. This causes the loss of 2 periods 
(instead of one) for each lag introduced in the model. 
8 Using linear or ordered models for happiness regressions makes little difference as long as fixed effects are taken 
into account (Ferrer-i-Carbonell et al., 2004).  
5
habituation (inertia): feelings of happiness this year would make an individual prone to 
feeling of unhappiness (happiness) during the next year. 
 For detailed information on all datasets along with descriptive statistics please refer to 
Appendix 1. Data definitions are available in Appendix 2. An individual’s self reported 
happiness is obtained from the question: “How satisfied are you with your life, all things 
considered?” Responses range from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). 
The measure of income used is the logarithm of net total annual household income, deflated 
to prices of a baseline year. Some of the control variables are: education, household 
composition, employment and marital status indicators. We always report standard errors 
clustered at the individual level. 
As we will discuss below, the identification strategy for γ  depends crucially on the 
error term not being persistent. Our strategy consists in controlling for as many covariates 
and semi-parametric controls as possible, such as the usual individual controls, time and 
fixed effects, region-specific time effects and individual-specific trends.9
Many control variables may be endogenous. For instance, there could be 
simultaneous causality between income and well being: i.e. happiness may help people make 
more money, and not just the other way around (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Controlling for as 
many covariates as possible is our strategy to minimize the potential biases. Our approach 
has the benefit of being applicable to many data sets, which will allow us to check the 
external validity. In the following section we will construct the analysis “from the bottom 
up”, introducing models one by one. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Specific Habituation 
Suppose that happiness depends on present and past values of individual income10,11
tiy ,
  
(  and 1, −tiy , respectively): 
9 Including further control variables may cloud the interpretation for certain coefficients of interest. For instance, 
income improves life satisfaction through expenditures on health and education. If you include these variables 
you will downward bias the coefficient on income, since you will not be capturing its impact through health and 
education. In the presence of measurement error, the introduction of an additional variable may bias an otherwise 
unbiased estimate. 
10 Unfortunately, the data sets we work with only contain information on income and not consumption. Headey et 
al. (2004) used household economic panel data from five countries to find that in the two countries where 
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tiititiit yyH ,1,2,1 εαθθ +++= −    (1) 
For the sake of expositional simplicity, we will not write down all of the covariates 
included in the regressions. Including lagged variables is also important if one is interested 
only in contemporary effects. Suppose, for instance, that income is autocorrelated: 
tititi yy ,1,, υτ += − . If (1) was the Data Generating Process (DGP) and we did not include 1, −tiy  
as a regressor, then the estimation of 1θ  would be seriously biased. 
We already mentioned that the habituation effects can be the result of different 
phenomenon. Suppose for example that happiness is a function of income ( ty ) above the 
income aspiration ( tA ): 
( ) tttt AyH ξα +−=    (2) 
Where tA  is determined at t-1. If we included tA  along with 1−ty  as explanatory 
variables in a regression, the later would have a null coefficient. But we cannot observe tA , 
so we estimate the following regression: 
tttt yyH εββ ++= −121    (3) 
Since tA  is formed at t-1, it probably is strongly correlated with 1−ty . The equation (3) 
would yield 0ˆ2 ≠β  because 2βˆ  is indirectly capturing the effect of aspirations. We do not 
care whether the true model is (2) or (3), as long as 1−ty  is measuring an adaptation effect.12
Even though marginal utility from income is a parameter that is of special interest to 
economists, we want to measure adaptation to any specific life domain (e.g. getting married, 
becoming unemployed): 
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−    (2) 
consumption data was available, non-durable consumption expenditure appeared to be at least as important to 
happiness as income. We do not observe wealth either. However, by construction fixed effects account for initial 
wealth and then only changes in wealth (income and consumption) matter. 
11 The distribution of income within the household does impact on individual happiness (e.g. Bonke et al., 2003). If 
we also control for individual income the results do not change. We focus only on household income for the sake 
of brevity. 
12 Notice that (3) is equivalent to a model consisting of changes in income: ( ) -  a  a 1,,2,1, −+= titititi yyyH , 
211 aa +=β  and 22 a−=β . That is, 1β  would reflect the permanent effect plus the transitory effect, and 2β  
would subtract the transitory effect in the subsequent period. 
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Results for this specification are presented in column (1) of Table 1A. The coefficients 
on current and past income are statistically significant, and some of the lags for control 
variables are significant as well.13
For unemployment habituation is only 72% after 2 years. We found a similar pattern 
for marriage, divorce, and childbirth, among others. Some of the covariates and their 
respective lags are presented in Table 2. These findings are comparable to those found in 
other studies (Clark et al., 2008; Lucas et al., 2003; Diener et al., 2006).  
 The lags for most of our controls are of opposite sign to the 
current level’s coefficient (and in the expected direction). For instance, losing a spouse today 
is associated with a coefficient of -0.6 that is statistically significant at the 1% level, but the 
lags (also statistically significant) are 0.31 and 0.29. In other words, reported happiness 
bounces back completely after two years.  
4.2. General Habituation 
Consider the following model: 
tiitititi XHH ,,1,, εαλγ +++= −     (3) 
Where tiX ,  is a vector of “fundamentals” of happiness. Suppose such fundamentals 
are held constant at ssiX . The steady state of happiness is: )1( γλ −=
ss
i
ss
i XH . Therefore, the 
contemporaneous effect of changing the fundamentals is given by λˆ , while the effect in the 
long run is )ˆ1/(ˆ γλ − . If we find a negative (positive) γˆ , this would imply that the impact on 
the steady state is smaller (greater) than the contemporaneous effect. 
13 The sign of the coefficients on lagged income are not negative as obtained in Di Tella et al. (2007). We find 
negative coefficients when income is the only variable being lagged. 
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The dynamics for a negative γ  are very simple: an increase from ssiX  to φ+
ss
iX  will 
initially increase happiness in λφ , next period happiness will drop by (the absolute value of) 
γλφ , then it will increase by λφγ 2 , then drop by (the absolute value of) λφγ 3 , and so on (if 
γ  is positive then those are all increments). Note that happiness oscillates when approaching 
the new steady state. Also, notice that 1−→γ  does not imply full habituation but half-
adaptation (and it becomes unit-root). Figure 1 illustrates both habituation and inertia for 
positive transitory and permanent shocks on happiness. 
Happiness probably depends on past realizations of the fundamentals as well: 
tiititititi XXHH ,1,2,11,, εαλλγ ++++= −−    (4) 
The one-period effect would be 1ˆλ , the two-period effect would be 21 ˆˆ λλ + , and the 
long run effect would be )ˆ1()ˆˆ( 21 γλλ −+ . We will estimate the baseline model presented in 
(1) with one lag of happiness and 2 lags of controls.14
γ
 If the controls were not included in the 
regression and the hypothesis of specific-habituation were true, the estimations of  would 
be biased (since 1, −tiX  is correlated by construction with 1, −tiH ). 
It is well known that using the within transformation when estimating (4) would 
involve a considerable small-T bias (Nickell, 1981). We will consider the standard solutions. 
Using all of the available lags of the dependent variable as instruments in the particular 
14 Since the panels are significantly shorter for the SHP and BHPS, we only include 1 lag of controls for these 
cases. By introducing more lags we reduce sample size significantly, especially in the BHPS. 
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context of happiness regressions is not optimal. Intuitively, the relation between 
)( 2,1, −− − titi HH  and 19, −tiH  is undoubtedly weak and most probably noisy.  
Angrist et al. (2008) illustrates this intuitively. Denote ( )QF ⋅= 2R ξσ  the F-statistic 
for the joint significance of all regressors in the first stage regression, where Q  is the number 
of instruments, 2ξσ  is the residual variance and R  is the R-squared of the first stage. Then 
the bias can be approximately written as (Angrist et al., 2008, Chapter 4): 
[ ]
1
1ˆ
22 +
≈−
F
E SLS
ξ
ηξ
σ
σ
ββ  
Only as F  gets large 2SLS does better than OLS. When the instruments are weak, the 
F-statistic itself varies inversely with the number of instruments. To see why, consider 
adding useless instruments to your 2SLS model, that is, instruments with no effect on the 
first-stage R-squared. The model’s sum of squares and the residual variance will remain the 
same, but Q  will go up. The F-statistic becomes smaller as a result. This is why the addition 
of many weak instruments increases bias. Additionally, when T is large many instruments 
are generated, which ultimately is worse for asymptotic results (Cameron and Trivedi, 2008). 
Indeed, there is Monte Carlo evidence suggesting that Anderson-Hsiao (hereafter, 
HS) yields less bias than other methods such as Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Bover, and its 
efficiency compares favorably (e.g. Judson et al., 1999). Therefore, we will use HS as the 
baseline model (especially for expositional simplicity). However, we also present results for 
AB estimates. Coefficients and standard errors are quite similar between both methods. 
In column (2) we show the autoregressive happiness model estimated by the within 
transformation. The estimate for the autoregressive term is positive and statistically different 
from zero.15 1<γ If  the sign of the small-T bias is negative, which in turn suggests that 
0>γ . This is puzzling, because the widespread prior is that happiness displays habituation 
instead of inertia. From the within estimates we know that the positive coefficient is not the 
product of small-T bias: on the contrary, the estimated coefficient is positive in spite of the 
small-T bias.  
Consider the first differences of equation (3): 
15 Note that for the SHP and BHPS the coefficient is negative, product of the small T bias. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1,,1,,2,1,1,, −−−−− −+−+−=− titititititititi XXHHHH εελγ     (5) 
The source of the bias is clear above: the term ( )2,1, −− − titi HH  is correlated with the 
error term ( )1,, −− titi εε  through 1, −tiε . The HS estimator exploits the fact that 2, −tiH  can be 
used as an instrumental variable for ( )2,1, −− − titi HH . The results for HS are presented in 
column (3). The γˆ  is positive and statistically relevant at the 1% level. 
For the following estimates we test the presence of weak instruments based on the 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test. The results are similar when using alternative tests. Under the 
null that the instrumental variables are weak and the over-identifying restrictions are valid, 
we reject can reject it at the 1% level. For the upcoming regressions we will not mention the 
weak instrument test unless we cannot reject the null. 
Notice that the model in differences has first order autocorrelation by construction. 
However, if there was second order autocorrelation then the instrument variables would not 
be valid. Indeed, we reject the null hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation at the 1% 
level.  
4.3. Second-order General Habituation 
The most basic explanation for the second order autocorrelation in the difference 
model is that the model in levels should include two lags of happiness instead of one: 
tiitititi HHH ,2,21,1, εαγγ +++= −−     (6) 
Take first differences: 
)()()()( 1,,3,2,22,1,11,, −−−−−− −+−+−=− titititititititi HHHHHH εεγγ     (7) 
Where 2, −tiH  is as an instrumental variable for ( )2,1, −− − titi HH  and 3, −tiH  for 
)( 3,2, −− − titi HH . The results are presented in column (4) of Table 1A. Both lags are positive 
and statistically significant, though the second lag is 1/3 the coefficient of the first lag. Now 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation.  
The results for Arellano-Bond are reported in columns (4) and (6), respectively. The 
results are not substantially different from HS. We cannot reject the null of the Sargan test at 
1% level in either case (though we can when shortening instrument matrix). In what follows 
11
we will explore whether the positive autoregressive coefficient is the product of model 
misspecification bias. 
4.4. Lagged Unobservables 
We know that happiness depends on unobservables ( tS ): 
tiitititititi SXXHH ,,1,2,11,, εαβλλγ +++++= −−     (8) 
Take first differences: 
)()(
)()()(
1,,1,,
2,1,21,,12,1,1,,
−−
−−−−−−
−+−+
−+−+−=−
titititi
titititititititi
SS
XXXXHHHH
εεβ
λλγ
    (9) 
If (8) were true and (4) was estimated instead, the error term in the difference 
equation would be the whole second line in (9).  Suppose that the unobservable is persistent 
(i.e. 1, −tiS  and 2, −tiS  are correlated). Since 2, −tiH  and 2, −tiS  are correlated by definition, using 
2, −tiH  as an instrument for )( 2,1, −− − titi HH  would not be valid. 
Persistence of omitted variables is probably the main source of bias in the dynamic 
framework. An example of an unobserved variable is the omitted variability in material 
standard of living, since we can only control for proxies (such as declared income and 
individual fixed-effects). 
But the error-term autocorrelation may also be given by specific-habituation of an 
unobservable variable: 
tiititititititi SSXXHH ,1,2,11,2,11,, εαββλλγ ++++++= −−−     (10) 
Where tiS ,  is not persistent in this case. Nevertheless, this type of bias is not that 
problematic at all: we would be confusing general habituation with specific habituation, but 
in the end we would be capturing genuine habituation. In summary, we need to control for 
unobserved variability in happiness that may be persistent. 
4.5. Individual-Specific Time Trends 
We imperfectly measure many aspects of life (e.g. marital status is a coarse proxy for 
love and relationships) and we completely omit some (e.g. intellectual achievements). Since 
12
we cannot use more time-varying controls than those available in the data, we explore a 
semi-parametric strategy. 
The most reasonable step would be to include individual-specific time trends, since 
omitting them could generate substantial persistence in the error term. In order to see this 
clearly, consider a time series model without the autoregressive component, but with a linear 
trend: 
tt tH ξρ +⋅=     (11) 
Where tξ  is i.i.d. with mean zero and variance ξσ . Imagine that instead, we are 
estimating a dynamic model without a linear trend:  
ttt HH εγ +⋅= −1     (12) 
OLS would yield: 
( )
( )
( )
( ) 0
,,0ˆ
1
1
1
1 ≠
+⋅+−⋅
=
+⋅
+=
−
−
−
−
t
tt
t
tt
HVar
ttCov
HVar
tHCovimpl ξρξρρξργ   (13) 
That is to say, if we did not account for time trends we would be estimating a “false” 
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable. Consider a model with both individual-specific 
linear time trend and individual-specific intercept: 
tiiititi tHH ,211,, εααγ +++= −   (14) 
Taking first differences does not solve the problem: 
)()( 1,,22,1,1,, −−−− −++−=− titiititititi HHHH εεαγ   (15) 
If we denote 1,,, −−= tititi HHR , it is clear that the equation above is a dynamic model 
with fixed effects, subject to the usual small-T bias. If we omitted i2α  as included regressor it 
would be part of the error term, and since i2α  is correlated to 2, −tiH  by construction, the 
latter would no longer be a valid instrument (also, notice that the bias would be positive). 
To estimate the model with individual-specific trends, take differences once again:  
)2()2()2( 2,1,,3,2,1,2,1,, −−−−−−− +−++−=+− tititititititititi HHHHHH εεεγ   (16) 
Now we can use 3, −tiH  as instrumental variable.  Results are reported in column (7) of 
Table 1. Past happiness is still positive and statistically different from zero at the 1% level, 
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but the coefficient is now about half of the coefficients obtained in the previous 
specifications. If we repeat the exercise using two lags of happiness, the second lag of 
happiness is not statistically significant anymore. Notice that by construction we now have 
autocorrelation of first and second order in the (second) difference equation. As needed, we 
cannot reject the null of no third-order autocorrelation. 
Fixed effects control for certain things depending on the time horizon. For example, 
when the panel is just two-years long many things remain approximately fixed: career 
choice, family composition, income aspirations, the criteria used to answer to the happiness 
question, etc. But when we increase the time horizon further, practically everything becomes 
time-varying. That is to say, using a longer time horizon comes at a cost, since it introduces 
biases in potentially all coefficients. Using individual-specific time trends addresses this 
problem, since we can control not only for the within-individual variation that is constant, 
but also for that variation that evolves approximately as a linear trend. 
4.6. Moving-Average Error Term 
There is a more direct way to solve the problem of having a persistent error term. In 
the simplest scenario the error term follows a MA(1) (moving average), so the difference of 
the error term is MA(2). The convenient property of the MA(1) process is that the second- 
and higher-order autocorrelations are zero. As a consequence, if ti ,ε  is MA(1) in equation (5) 
then, even though 2−tH  is no longer valid as an instrumental variable, 3−tH  and longer lags 
remain valid. 
This obviously comes at a price, since weak instrumental variables exacerbate the 
small-sample bias of the IV estimates. In column (9) of Table 1A we present the same 
regression presented in column (3) but using 3−tH  as instrument instead. The coefficient for 
past happiness is 5 times larger than in previous specifications and statistically significant. 
This is not surprising since we suspect that the instrument is weak. Curiously, we cannot 
reject the null of presence of a weak instrument. As required, we cannot reject the null of no 
third-order autocorrelation. 
On the contrary, if the error term in the model was AR(1), tititi ,1,, νρεε += − , we 
would not be able to apply the same strategy, since ti ,ε  would be correlated to all of its past 
values. Nevertheless, we can still learn something. Consider the first difference: 
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If we use 2−tH  as an instrument, the asymptotic bias would be: 
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Under the habituation theory the denominator is negative. The sign of the numerator 
depends on the sign of the autocorrelation of the error term. If the error term is positively 
autocorrelated ( 0>ρ ), we could get 0ˆ >γ  even if γ  was negative. 
We already pointed out that one source of error autocorrelation is specific-habituation 
in unobservables. However, such a thing would generate a negative bias instead of a positive 
one. A positive bias could be generated by unobserved determinants of happiness (without 
specific-habituation) that are positively correlated over time. 
This is most likely explained by anticipatory feelings (e.g. Caplin et al., 2001). 
Basically, people act “as if” they maximize discounted lifetime utility. But some of the desire 
to delay consumption may be due to the fact that people actually derive present utility from 
thinking about future consumption. 
Assume tiA ,  is some unobserved shock to happiness subject to one-period 
anticipatory feelings: ( )1, +tiAF , where ( ) 0>⋅′F  and ( ) ccF sgnsgn =  (i.e. if you anticipate 
something that will make you happier tomorrow, it must make you happier today). Then 
happiness would be: 
( ) tititiititi AFAXH ,1,,,, ξαλ ++++= +   (19) 
Where ( ) titititi AFA ,1,,, ξε ++= +  is the error term. Even if ti ,ξ  and tiA ,  were i.i.d. and 
independent from each other, the error autocorrelation would not be zero: 
( ) ( )( ) 0,, ,,,1, >=− titititi AAFCovCov εε   (20) 
That is, anticipatory feelings may help explain the puzzle. We can learn about the 
plausibility of this hypothesis by checking whether there is evidence of anticipatory feelings 
for the observable determinants of happiness. We ran many variants of the dynamic and 
static models adding the leads of all of the individual controls (e.g. marital status, income). 
Indeed, some of the coefficients on leads are statistically significative and have the same sign 
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of the level-coefficients. Similar findings are reported in Clark et al. (2008), which favor 
anticipatory feelings at least as a partial explanation of the puzzle. 
4.7. Robustness 
The non-response rate for the life satisfaction question is quite low for the GSOEP and 
BHPS (8,9% and 0% respectively), and quite high for the SHP (24,4%). We estimated the 
probability of non-response for this question using first wave characteristics and did not find 
important predictors of non-response (they explained only 2% of the variation). Attrition is 
also an important issue in household panels, especially for the GSOEP given its length. By 
the last wave we only count with around half the households from the first wave. But there 
are many covariates (e.g. income, civil status) each with few missing values but that 
combined (take into consideration that the model includes lags for all the variables involved) 
make the mean number of observations per household drop significantly. For instance, in the 
GSOEP each individual contributes on average 9 observations (out of 22 waves). 
From both theoretical results and Monte-Carlo applications we know that the small-T 
bias is more exacerbated the lower is T. We can run the regression for a subset of individuals 
that contributes (say) more than 15 observations each. This is valid as long as the censoring 
process is completely random, so there is a trade-off between selection-bias and small-T bias. 
We tried this with all of the regressions and the results are almost the same. 
A second concern is that happiness scores may be too influenced by recent events. For 
instance, in Schwarz (1987) half of the people using a photocopier found a dime that had 
been randomly planted in the coin return. After copying, the individuals rated how happy 
they were with their entire lives on a 7-point scale: the individuals who found a dime scored 
6.5 compared to 5.6 of the other group. Even though these “extremely recent” events are 
probably completely random, they generate a considerable attenuation bias in the 
autoregressive coefficient. Far from explaining it, this accentuates the puzzle.16
4.8. Summary 
 
Contrary to the widespread prior among economists and non-economists, we found 
positive and significant coefficients on lagged happiness. In other words, happiness appears 
16 Also, the measurement error probably makes the specific-habituation variables capture part of the general-
habituation effects. 
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to display inertia instead of habituation. The results are strongly robust among databases 
and identification strategies. This puzzle is probably driven by persistence of unobservable 
variables, like the case of anticipatory feelings. However, there is an alternative explanation: 
self-report scores may be simply inconsistent over time. We explore this argument in the next 
Section, and we test it in the subsequent Section. 
5. The “scale treadmill” 
It is true that some objective measures of hedonic states do correlate with self-reports, 
like smiling frequency (Ekman et al., 1990), peer reports, memory measures, and clinical 
ratings (Pavot et al., 1991), among many others. Some papers use alternative dependent 
variables: for instance, Luttmer (2004) uses measures of well-being like the incidence of 
depression and poor sleep and finds similar results as those obtained using standard 
happiness data.17
But even if happiness scores were consistent at a single point in time, it is possible 
that the happiness scale shifts over time. If that were the case, the results on hedonic 
adaptation would be invalidated to a large extent (Stevens, 1958). There have been occasional 
attempts to avoid the problems created by “scale-norming” in affective habituation studies. 
For instance, in a study of chronic dialysis patients Baron et al. (2003) found that making the 
scales more precise only reinforces the estimates of adaptation. And Kahneman et al. (2006) 
argue that other measures of current happiness (e.g. from the day reconstruction method) 
show even stronger hedonic adaptation than happiness scores (for more details see Frederick 
et al., 1999). 
 
Even though people say that they frequently think about their happiness, the answer 
to the question “how happy are you?” is probably based to a large extent on heuristics. What 
we think of happiness is probably a synthesis of lots of biological processes taking place in 
the brain. After all, scientists are far from reaching an agreement on what happiness actually 
is (see Diener et al., 1991). Then it should not be that surprising that people interpret 
happiness scores in different ways. Similarly, since scientists change their interpretation of 
happiness over time, it is not that obvious that people have stable interpretation of the 
happiness scores from one decade to the following. 
17 We must be careful when interpreting results from reported happiness (see for example Wilkinson, 2007). For 
an analysis of more general problems with subjective survey data see Bertrand et al. (2001) and Schwarz (1999). 
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Even if individuals could indeed perceive their true happiness in a similar fashion 
and consistently over time, they possibly would not know how to measure such a thing. If 
we want someone to report height, we can simply give her a bar and she could go and 
measure different heights using that bar as a unit-measure.18
Happiness scores always involve a scale: e.g. from 1 to 10, where 1 is “very unhappy” 
and 10 is “very happy”. We are implicitly letting each individual choose their own unit-
measure. Some people may answer how happy they are compared to last year, other people 
answer how happy they are compared to how happy they could be if they had done things 
differently, and yet other people could answer how happy they are compared to their 
neighbors. 
 But there is no way for us to 
show you a “util”. 
Indeed, Hagerty et al. (2003) argue that participants in self-reported happiness 
surveys do not all use the same internal standard for reporting their life satisfaction. He 
claims that life satisfaction judgments are highly labile and perspective dependent, and the 
way we answer a question about how satisfied we are with life as a whole will depend on the 
particular criteria that happens to be active at the time. The criteria may change so much 
during 10 or 20 years that any dynamic happiness regression would be simply invalid. 
Different people choosing different measures is not a major problem, as long as they 
remain constant over time, since fixed effects will account for such differences. Indeed, 
maybe the greatest role of fixed effects in happiness regressions is to account for that.  The 
good thing about happiness questions like “How are things compared to your parents?” is 
that the scale, even though differs notably between individuals, may be more consistent 
within individuals over time. 
Happiness scores are not good or bad, but they are reasonably good for some 
applications and less good for other. For instance, running a regression using cross-section 
data seems much less reliable than using panel data with fixed effects. Intuitively, what Rose 
understands by “rather unhappy” can be very different from what Maria does, and then it 
would be misleading to compare their responses directly. But there is no such thing as a free 
lunch: once we use panel data, we need to assume that what Maria understands as “rather 
18 The idea of absolutes has always been in the minds of physicists. Our unit-measure for distance, for example, is 
indeed relative: one foot is the distance that a photon travels in one nanosecond. 
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unhappy” today is the same than she understood as “rather unhappy” 1, 5 and 20 years ago. 
As we look at longer panels the fixed effects control for less things, among them the criteria 
used to assess happiness.  
The difference between what Maria understands as “happy” in the present and 20 
years ago can be on average as large as the difference between what both Maria and Rose 
understand as “happy” today. That is to say, the very same principle that casts doubts on the 
internal validity when using cross-section regressions also casts doubts on the internal 
validity for long panels. In our dynamic happiness regressions we did control partially for 
this possibility: the model with individual-specific time trends let us control for a happiness 
scale that changes approximately linearly over time. 
Assume that people use the same criteria for assessing happiness, and the only thing 
that may change over time is the scale associated to that criterion. For instance, a given 
individual always answers how happy he is compared to his neighbors, but the happiness of 
his neighbors may be changing over time. 
Denote reported happiness rtiH ,  and true happiness tiH , . Define tiHj ,  as the true 
happiness individual i  should feel to answer jH rti =,  in period t . Reported happiness 
would simply assign rtiH ,  based on the cutoff values tiH ,1  to tiHJ , . For example: 
 
Hi,t
r = Π (H10i,t − Hi,t ) (H10i,t − H1i,t ){ }, where the function 
 
Π ⋅{} returns the integer closest to 
the argument. In the simplest case there are only two reference points, high happiness 
( tiH ,10 ) and low happiness ( tiH ,1 ), and reported happiness is a measure of the relative 
position between those points. A larger tiH ,1  or tiH ,10  would imply a more “demanding” 
scale. 
The missing piece of the puzzle is the way in which people update the reference 
points. Let’s analyze first the criterion by which people compare their own feelings of 
happiness to those of their neighbors.19 ),( tiG Let  denote the set of individuals in the 
reference group of individual i  at period t . Then the reference point may be the happiness 
of the most unhappy and happy individuals in the reference group: 
19 Individuals do not necessarily have to “infer” how happy the rest of the people are, since there is evidence that 
people can directly measure other people’s happiness, for example, through the Duchenne Smile (Ekman et al., 
1990). 
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We can test this theory. Ask individual A and B (from different reference groups) 
how happy they are in a 1 to 10 scale. Then ask individual A (B) whether individual B (A) is 
happier than him. If the hypothesis is true, individual A and B may both report the same 
happiness score (e.g. 8), even though individual A declares to be happier than individual B 
and individual B declares to be less happy than individual A. 
Indeed, Schkade et al. (1998) already performed this test. They found that students in 
California and in the Midwest rated exactly equal in overall life satisfaction even though they 
revealed a widespread expectation, shared by residents of both regions, that Californians are 
happier than Midwesterners. 
This criterion for assessing happiness has profound consequences for the literature: 
intertemporal comparisons of reported happiness would be misleading. In a celebrated 
paper Easterlin (1974) noticed that happiness responses are flat since World War II in the 
United States, despite of considerable increases in average income and material standard of 
living. If tiH ,1  and tiH ,10  have been increasing at the same rate, increasing actual happiness 
would be perfectly consistent with stagnated reported happiness. 20
Another possible criterion is using information on “hypothetical happiness.” For 
instance, people could answer how happy they are compared to how happy they could be in 
some “reference situations.” The 
 
tiH ,10  could be the hypothetical happiness of (ceteris 
paribus) winning the lottery and tiH ,1  could be the hypothetical happiness of (ceteris 
paribus) suffering a heart attack. The hypothetical situations (and their corresponding 
weights) change substantially over time, generating reported happiness that is (again) highly 
inconsistent over time. 
More generally, suppose that the individual has a prior about the distribution of 
hedonic states in every state of nature next year (conditional on her following the optimal 
policy function). Denote ptijH ,)(  to the j-th decile of that distribution of potential hedonic 
20 If we want to take Easterlin’s Paradox at face value, we should be able to show that what someone meant by 
“happy” just after the WWII reflects from an objective point of view the same things that people mean by happy 
today. On the contrary, when people are asked to report how well they are doing relative to their own and their 
parents’ past, self-reported happiness levels rose dramatically (Hagerty, 2003). Reported happiness may be 
constant, but that does not necessarily mean that actual happiness has not been changing. 
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states. The individual could answer jH rti =,  if actual happiness is to the left of the j-th decile 
of potential happiness: ptiti
p
ti jHjHjH ,,, )()1()1( ≤−<− . For instance, our individual does 
not expect to get a promotion, and then his definition of “very happy” is “getting a 
promotion.” If that same individual learns that it is more probable that he will get a 
promotion, then the scale will adjust accordingly and by the time he actually gets the 
promotion then “getting a promotion” will be the definition of just “happy.” 
Notice that the individual in the example is actually happier with the promotion than 
without the promotion. The problem has to do with people failing to reflect changes in actual 
happiness on changes in reported happiness. For instance, Gilbert et al. (1998) asked voters in 
the state of Texas how they would feel after the election if their favorite candidate lost. 
Respondents claimed they would be unhappy in that scenario, but when asked a month 
later, they reported to be just as happy whether their favorite candidate won or not. 
The reference points may also be based on historical information on own happiness, 
such as the worst and best situations ever experienced21
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Notice that mean reversion in reported happiness is generated solely by the updating 
of the scales (i.e. “scale treadmill”) and not due to actual hedonic adaptation. A great deal of 
the empirical challenge is to identify how much of the observed treadmill patterns in 
reported happiness are due to treadmill effects in actual happiness. Consider a very simple 
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If )(tiΛ  was positive but close to zero, an increase in current happiness would not be 
reflected in reported happiness. That is to say, the “scale treadmill” is so strong that reported 
happiness may bounce back even when actual happiness is not (notice that this principle 
applies both to general-habituation and specific-habituation). 
21 We must then acknowledge people’s limitations with affective memory: for instance, individuals usually under-
estimate negative past experiences (Wilson et al., 2003). 
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In our paper we found a positive autoregressive coefficient on reported happiness. 
The question is whether that may be consistent with a negative autoregressive coefficient on 
actual happiness. That would be possible as long as )(tiΛ  was negative. That is, if an 
increase in actual happiness increases more than one-to-one the implicit scale of reported 
happiness. 
This hypothesis is plausible in light of the recent test by Smith et al. (2006). They 
elicited current levels of happiness from people with colostomies and those whose 
colostomies had been reversed. Both groups reported identical happiness. However, they 
also asked each group how happy they had been in the past. Those with colostomies recalled 
being significantly happier than they currently were. On the other hand, those with reversed 
colostomies recalled being significantly less happy. Also, neither group believed that people 
with colostomies were about as happy as people whose colostomies had been reversed. For 
more details see Loewenstein et al. (2008), where they discuss similar results for dialysis 
patients and happiness across age groups. 
In Table 3 we present the autoregressive coefficient for other hedonic states: 
satisfaction with health, household income, work and spare time (i.e. equivalent variables for 
the three databases). We use our favorite specification, given by column (7) from Table 1A. 
Even though all hedonic states are expected to be adaptive, we always find positive 
autoregressive coefficients.22
6. Daily happiness 
 One possibility is that the positive coefficients are an artifact of 
ever-changing self-reported scales, or maybe one year is too long of a period to identify 
adaptation. In the following Section we will address both possibilities by using daily data. 
Even though the criteria to assess self-reported happiness may not be consistent 
through 20 years, it should be very consistent during 52 days. This fact will allow us to test 
whether the temporal inconsistency of happiness scores can be the explanation for the 
puzzle. 
Notwithstanding, there are further advantages from using daily as opposed to yearly 
data. From an econometric point of view more frequent data means very good news, since it 
22 Perez Truglia (2009) shows that each reward system should have its own (relatively independent) adaptation 
process. 
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eliminates the bias related to small-T in dynamic panels. In addition, happiness dynamics 
may be much stronger in shorter periods. Habituation to income takes years (e.g. Di Tella et 
al., 2007), and burn victims reported similar levels of satisfaction to the control group one 
year after the accident (Patterson et al., 1993). Since the fundamentals of daily happiness may 
be much more volatile, we should expect them to adapt more rapidly. 
We will use the database from the first study in Oishi et al. (2001).23
For the dependent variables, participants responded to statements on a ten-point 
scale about multiple feelings, such as contempt, happiness, anger, sadness, etc. Because of 
obvious space limitations, we report only the results for some selected variables, including a 
composite score on positive feelings (the sum of contempt, happiness, joy and pride). The 
results are similar for the scores that are not reported. 
 The participants 
were 79 male and 73 female undergraduate students at the University of Illinois. They were 
instructed to complete the daily report in the evening before they went to bed, and turn in 
each report the following day. For more details see Oishi et al. (2001). 
Since they are practically constant on a daily basis, the covariates that we have been 
using so far (e.g. income, civil status) cannot be used anymore. On a daily basis we expect 
hedonic states to be influenced mainly by sex, food, social interactions, etc. Indeed, the study 
measures those fundamentals. Firstly, daily pleasure is measured by asking the respondent 
“how frequently did you experience physical pleasure such as sex and food today?” each day 
on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (always) with a midpoint value of 4 (about 
half of the time). Secondly, social life satisfaction is measured by asking participants to 
indicate how satisfied they are with their social lives that day on a ten-point scale, where 1 is 
“not at all” and 10 is “extremely”.  Table A2 provides some descriptive statistics. 
The model is the same we have been working on: 
titi
R
r
rtir
Q
q
j
qtiq
j
ti XHH ,
0
,
1
,, εψαβγ ++++= ∑∑
=
−
=
−   
Where jtiH ,  is the j-th measure of well being, and Q is the number of lags of the 
dependent variable included as explanatory variable. The tiX ,  includes the variables on 
23 We thank Shigehiro Oishi and his coauthors Ulrich Schimmack and Ed Diener for making the database 
available to us. 
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pleasure and social satisfaction, and R is the number of lags included. The time effects are 
denoted tψ , and iα  are the individual fixed effects. In the regressions we use Q=R=5, but the 
results are bout the same for greater values (because of space constraints, we do not report all 
of the lags). 
The estimates for qγ  are positive (and decreasing in q ), as shown in column (1) of 
Table 4. Because of the same argument we presented for the yearly data, the estimates 
become negative once we control for individual-specific linear trends plus individual-specific 
week effects, as shown in column (2). 
The coefficients on lagged sex, food and social activity are positive for an obvious 
reason: those stimuli have delayed rewards. In fact, according to our estimates there is no 
specific adaptation and all the adaptation takes place through the general-adaptation 
channel.24 Moreover, the general-adaptation channel is quantitatively sizable: 30% of any 
change in happiness is reverted in the subsequent 5 days.25
In the yearly data we found a positive autoregressive coefficient and we wondered 
whether it could be the result of a positively-correlated error term. Now we have to wonder 
whether the negative coefficients may be the product of a negatively-correlated error term. If 
the error term is MA(1), then we could still use 
 
j
stiH 1, −−  as instrumental variable for 
j
stiH −, . 
Unfortunately, all the IV regressions that we tried suffer serious problems of weak 
instruments and under-identification. Having data on more individuals would have helped a 
lot.  
6.1. Elation Theory 
Perez Truglia (2009) shows that, from an evolutionary point of view, some rewards 
and punishments must be expectation-based. Even though this perspective is not common 
among economists, it is widespread in fields such as psychology and neuroscience. For 
instance, physiological work identified dopaminergic neurons in primates whose fluctuating 
output signals changes or errors in the predictions of future salient and rewarding events 
(e.g. Schultz et al., 1997). Intuitively, bursts of impulse activity mean that the reward is more 
24 Rigorously, we can only say that the delayed rewards more than cancel out the specific habituation (if any). 
25 Many economists estimate that the effect of income on happiness is very small. Since most individual panels are 
yearly, it can be simply the result that adaptation to income and consumption is taking place in a matter of 
months. 
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than expected, a pause means that the reward is less than expected and no change means 
reward is just as expected.  
Kimball et al. (2006) offer a great terminology to address this. They define elation as 
the component of happiness due to recent news (i.e. deviations with respect to expectations). 
If expectations are rational, news is unpredictable and furthermore it does not stand as news 
for very long: the initial burst of elation dissipates once the full import of news is emotionally 
and cognitively processed. 
We cannot observe either “expectations” or “deviations from expectations.” 
Notwithstanding, yesterday’s happiness may work as a great proxy: high happiness would 
indicate good news (elation), while low happiness would indicate bad news (dismay). A 
negative qγ  would then simply indicate that part of happiness is due to elation. The greater 
qγ , the greater the share due to elation. And we can even learn how long it takes to 
cognitively and emotionally process news on average: according to our estimates, around 
five days. 
6.2. Summary 
Contrary to the yearly database, the autoregressive coefficients in the daily 
regressions are negative and statistically significant. This supports our theory that self-
reported scores may not be time-consistent in yearly data. However, it is also possible that 
the error term is just less positively autocorrelated in daily than in yearly data. Or happiness 
may take much less than a year to habituate. 
Life satisfaction is a complex subject, and we need to combine perspectives from 
economics, psychology, philosophy, and so on. On the contrary, daily hedonic states are 
more about friends, enemies, sex, food, accidents, finding a dime, and other things that are 
easier to understand and measure. With daily panels we can (feasibly) randomize treatments, 
avoid attrition, get objective measures of the hedonic states, and more. Even though life 
satisfaction is closer to the notion of welfare implied by economists, we can use daily data as 
an intermediate step to advance our research agenda.26
26 For instance, we may be interested in studying asymmetric adaptation or leads in happiness. But such a thing 
would be very complicated in yearly data, because we have to deal with the problem of small-T bias. A further 
advantage of using daily data is that the “savings” in econometric complexity can be invested in exploring 
models that are richer from an economic point of view. 
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7. Conclusions 
We argued that happiness regressions may be dynamic. The first inquiry is whether 
using dynamic instead of static regressions modifies the estimates on the (static and 
dynamic) coefficients of the most common variables in the happiness literature. As shown in 
Table 2, the coefficients are roughly the same, specially taking into consideration the great 
loss of efficiency and sample size associated with running the autoregressive regressions.  
Contrary to the prior among economists and non-economists, using yearly panels we 
found that the coefficient on lagged happiness is positive and statistically significant. The 
results are strongly robust between databases, despite of two of the panels being very short. 
One possible explanation of the puzzle is the presence of unobservable determinants of 
happiness that are positively correlated through time: e.g. anticipatory feelings. 
However, there is a deeper explanation: self-report scores may not be consistent 
through time, not even within individuals. Even though we cannot test this hypothesis 
directly, we do know that subjective scores must be much more consistent through 52 days 
than through 20 years. As a matter of fact, when we estimate the model using a daily panel, 
the coefficients on lagged happiness are negative and statistically significant. The results are 
strongly robust between different subjective scores. 
Happiness regressions are still far from being taken at face value, especially in more 
complex models like that of hedonic adaptation. We need novel empirical strategies to solve 
some of the empirical challenges we have been discussing. For instance, we need data with 
different frequencies to learn differences in the timing of hedonic adaptation. And we need 
sources of exogenous variability in happiness, either from randomization (e.g. Cruces et al., 
2009), from Natural Experiments (e.g. Becchetti et al., 2007), or from controlled lab 
experiments (e.g. Charness et al., 2001; McBride, 2007). 
If we want to use yearly data, we need to learn how to distinguish between the effects 
of reported happiness and actual happiness. We should at least use alternative happiness 
scores to test whether the treadmill effects are in fact an artifact. 
There is an aura of nihilism surrounding the hedonic adaptation theory. On the 
contrary, nearly all people believe (or would like to believe) that they can move in an 
“upward spiral” toward ever greater happiness (Sheldon et al., 2001). All in all, if happiness 
26
autocorrelation were indeed positive, that would mean that at least some people found the 
way to put the hedonic treadmill in reverse. 
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Table 1A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Within Within HS AB HS AB HS AB HS AB
Happiness t-1 0.13 0.098 0.108 0.14 0.141 0.046 0.037 0.538 0.339
[0.005]*** [0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.077]*** [0.042]***
Happiness t-2 0.041 0.044
[0.006]*** [0.006]***
Log Household Income t 0.13 0.121 0.066 0.067 0.062 0.063 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.052
[0.017]*** [0.016]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.028] [0.028] [0.024] [0.018]***
Log Household Income t-1 0.04 0.02 0.003 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.018 -0.016 -0.042 -0.021
[0.014]*** [0.014] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.028] [0.027] [0.022]* [0.017]
Log Household Income t-2 0.025 0.026 0.02 0.021 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.019
[0.013]* [0.013]** [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.026] [0.025] [0.021] [0.017]
Observations 118137 117473 98550 98550 97992 97992 82668 82668 97992 98550
Number of Individuals 13258 13221 11922 11922 11876 11876 10693 10693 11876 11922
Order 1 Autocorrelation Test (P-Value - - <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Order 2 " - - <0.001 <0.001 0.927 0.3747 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Order 3 " - - 0.6219 0.594 0.0104 0.0017 0.6789 0.7985 0.6732 0.7818
Sargan (P-Value) - - - <0.001 - <0.001 - 0.1507 - 0.0013
Weak Instruments (P-Value) - - <0.001 - <0.001 - <0.001 - <0.001 -
Notes: All columns include 2 lags of control variables, time and individual fixed effects. Time-varying controls include household composition, marital status, employment 
status, health proxies. Columns 1 and 2 are estimated using the within transformation. All odd numbered columns after are estimated using Anderson-Hsiao (HS); all even 
numbered columns are estimated using Arellano-Bond (AB). Columns 7 and 8 present estimates for individual specific time trend model transformation. Columns 9 and 10 
suppose persistent error term following a MA(1), a farther lag is used as instrument in this case. All standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 1% ***; 5% **; 10% 
Autoregressive Happiness Estimates - GSOEP
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Table 1B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Within Within HS AB HS AB HS AB HS AB
Happiness t-1 -0.123 0.111 0.106 0.146 0.107 0.071 0.056 0.623 0.232
[0.012]*** [0.024]*** [0.024]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.049] [0.047] [0.348]* [0.272]
Happiness t-2 0.045 0.029
[0.023]* [0.023]
Log Household Income t 0.089 0.09 0.06 0.061 0.102 0.102 0.153 0.153 0.099 0.057
[0.049]* [0.050]* [0.050] [0.049] [0.056]* [0.056]* [0.073]** [0.072]** [0.072] [0.053]
Log Household Income t-1 0.024 0.034 0.025 0.026 -0.013 -0.011 0.096 0.096 -0.021 0.026
[0.032] [0.036] [0.052] [0.051] [0.056] [0.055] [0.064] [0.063] [0.073] [0.057]
Observations 21454 17620 12214 12214 9136 9136 8098 8098 9136 12214
Number of Individuals 5232 4841 4014 4014 3443 3443 3090 3090 3443 4014
Order 1 Autocorrelation Test (P-Valu - - <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.007 <0.001
Order 2 " - - 0.4378 0.3456 0.7949 0.3456 <0.001 <0.001 0.1966 0.51
Order 3 " - - 0.3727 0.3114 0.6642 0.3114 0.8527 0.7847 0.8284 0.3062
Sargan (P-Value) - - - 0.143 - 0.143 - 0.2861 - 0.0921
Weak Instruments (P-Value) - - <0.001 - <0.001 - 0.132 - 0.0154 -
Notes: All columns include 1 lag of control variables, time and individual fixed effects. Time-varying controls include household composition, marital status, employment 
status, health proxies. Columns 1 and 2 are estimated using the within transformation. All odd numbered columns after are estimated using Anderson-Hsiao (HS); all even 
numbered columns are estimated using Arellano-Bond (AB). Columns 7 and 8 present estimates for individual specific time trend model transformation. Columns 9 and 10 
suppose persistent error term following a MA(1), a farther lag is used as instrument in this case. All standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 1% ***; 5% **; 
Autoregressive Happiness Estimates - SHP
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Table 1C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Within Within HS AB HS AB HS AB HS AB
Happiness t-1 -0.044 0.067 0.065 0.141 0.13 -0.016 -0.018 1.384 -0.266
[0.006]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.025]*** [0.024]*** [0.025] [0.025] [0.692]** [0.171]
Happiness t-2 0.051 0.045
[0.015]*** [0.014]***
Log Household Income t 0.033 0.035 0 0.001 0.014 0.015 -0.017 -0.017 -0.027 0.014
[0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.012] [0.012] [0.017] [0.017] [0.019] [0.019] [0.040] [0.013]
Log Household Income t-1 -0.005 -0.004 -0.018 -0.018 0.005 0.006 -0.014 -0.014 -0.007 -0.009
[0.009] [0.009] [0.012] [0.012] [0.017] [0.016] [0.020] [0.020] [0.034] [0.012]
Observations 70956 70956 45077 45077 24739 24739 24562 24562 24739 45077
Number of Individuals 16265 16265 14884 14884 13681 13681 13581 13581 13681 14884
Sargan (P-Value) - - <0.001 0.186 0.0114 0.0187
Weak Instruments (P-Value - - <0.001 <0.001 0.5258 <0.001
Autoregressive Happiness Estimates - BHPS
Notes: All columns include 1 lag of control variables, time and individual fixed effects. Autocorrelation tests are ommited since they could not be calculated thanks to 
the fact that there is a gap in the middle of the panel, reducing observations significantly when introducing lags. Time-varying controls include household 
composition, marital status, employment status, health proxies. Columns 1 and 2 are estimated using the within transformation. All odd numbered columns after are 
estimated using Anderson-Hsiao (HS); all even numbered columns are estimated using Arellano-Bond (AB). Columns 7 and 8 present estimates for individual 
specific time trend model transformation. Columns 9 and 10 suppose persistent error term following a MA(1), a farther lag is used as instrument in this case. All 
standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
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Table 2
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Within HS Within HS Within HS
Happiness t-1 0.046 0.071 -0.016
[0.012]*** [0.049] [0.025]
Log Household Income t 0.13 0.033 0.089 0.153 0.033 -0.017
[0.017]*** [0.028] [0.049]* [0.073]** [0.010]*** [0.019]
Log Household Income t-1 0.04 -0.018 0.024 0.096 -0.005 -0.014
[0.014]*** [0.028] [0.032] [0.064] [0.009] [0.020]
Log Household Income t-2 0.025 0.013
[0.013]* [0.026]
No. of Children in t 0.055 0.08 0.045 -0.05 0.07 0.026
[0.050] [0.081] [0.033] [0.084] [0.016]*** [0.040]
No. of Children in t-1 -0.018 -0.188 -0.022 -0.155 -0.063 -0.053
[0.048] [0.073]** [0.033] [0.095] [0.017]*** [0.042]
No. of Children in t-2 -0.003 -0.089
[0.048] [0.074]
Married in t 0.221 -0.075 0.323 -0.084 0.153 0.088
[0.040]*** [0.078] [0.080]*** [0.190] [0.039]*** [0.092]
Married in t-1 -0.163 -0.294 -0.143 -0.115 -0.136 0.029
[0.042]*** [0.067]*** [0.072]** [0.163] [0.038]*** [0.091]
Married in t-2 -0.147 -0.139
[0.038]*** [0.074]*
Widowed in t -0.597 -0.407 -0.74 -0.758 -0.333 -0.15
[0.094]*** [0.185]** [0.391]* [0.652] [0.094]*** [0.181]
Widowed in t-1 0.314 0.425 0.196 -1.154 0.133 0.11
[0.101]*** [0.160]*** [0.399] [0.984] [0.088] [0.202]
Widowed in t-2 0.292 0.183
[0.088]*** [0.185]
Not Employed in t -0.348 -0.411 -0.458 -0.399 -0.265 -0.288
[0.027]*** [0.047]*** [0.104]*** [0.239]* [0.037]*** [0.068]***
Not Employed in t-1 0.103 0.08 -0.139 0.019 0.063 -0.006
[0.027]*** [0.049] [0.094] [0.231] [0.033]* [0.062]
Not Employed in t-2 0.057 -0.013
[0.027]** [0.046]
Observations 118137 82668 21454 6939 70956 24562
Number of Individuals 13258 10693 5232 2662 16265 13581
GSOEP SHP BHPS
Notes: Columns for GSOEP include 2 lags of control variables (1 lag for other panels), time and individual fixed effects. 
Time-varying controls include household composition, marital status, employment status, health proxies. Column 1 
presents select control variables used in the first column of Tables 1. Columns 2 presents estimates for the individual-
specefic time trends specification in columns 7 of Tables 1. Columns 1 are estimated using within transformation, 
columns 2 are estimated using Anderson-Hsiao (HS). All standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 1% ***; 
5% **; 10% *.
Specific-Habituation Estimates
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Table 3
Satisfaction with: (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Health 0.082 0.025 0.07 0.022 0.098 0.056
[0.006]*** [0.012]** [0.018]*** [0.034] [0.010]*** [0.026]**
Observations 98823 82997 14734 10227 44726 24309
Household Income 0.104 0.032 0.11 0.014 0.132 0.082
[0.006]*** [0.012]*** [0.017]*** [0.032] [0.010]*** [0.028]***
Observations 96944 81105 16299 11458 44682 24279
Leisure Time 0.106 0.052 - - 0.078 0.043
[0.006]*** [0.012]*** [0.010]*** [0.030]
Observations 98138 82269 45077 24562
Work 0.101 0.047 - - 0.088 0.081
[0.009]*** [0.017]*** [0.013]*** [0.039]**
Observations 50793 40064 45077 24562
GSOEP SHP BHPS
Other Subjective Outcomes
Notes: Each coefficient belongs to a separate regression. Estimates for GSOEP include 2 lags of control variables (1 
lag otherwise), time and individual fixed effects. Time-varying controls include household composition, marital 
status, employment status, health proxies. Column 1 presents select estimates for Anderson-Hsiao (HS) identical to 
those presented in column 3 in Tables 1 (changing the dependent variables of course). Columns 2 present HS 
estimates for the individual specific time trend models presented in columns 7 in Tables 1. All standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level. 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
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Table 4A
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Dependent t-1 0.208*** -0.110*** 0.209*** -0.084*** 0.271*** -0.044**
(0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.016) (0.018)
Dependent t-2 0.075*** -0.169*** 0.075*** -0.141*** 0.103*** -0.111***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018)
Dependent t-3 0.036** -0.171*** 0.022 -0.152*** 0.041*** -0.139***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017)
Dependent t-4 0.052*** -0.125*** 0.016 -0.150*** 0.040*** -0.121***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
Dependent t-5 0.045*** -0.114*** 0.035*** -0.122*** 0.045*** -0.115***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017)
Social Satisfaction t 0.233*** 0.223*** 0.281*** 0.275*** 0.213*** 0.205***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012)
Social Satisfaction t-1 0.006 0.072*** 0.012 0.088*** -0.009 0.050***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009)
Social Satisfaction t-2 -0.003 0.063*** -0.027*** 0.053*** -0.019*** 0.036***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009)
Social Satisfaction t-3 0.004 0.064*** -0.017 0.043*** -0.014* 0.033***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009)
Social Satisfaction t-4 -0.008 0.046*** 0.005 0.056*** -0.009 0.031***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007)
Social Satisfaction t-5 -0.021** 0.014 -0.020** 0.023** -0.022*** 0.011
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Pleasure t 0.131*** 0.122*** 0.163*** 0.149*** 0.129*** 0.122***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014)
Pleasure t-1 -0.001 0.045*** -0.010 0.025 -0.0159* 0.022*
(0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.020) (0.009) (0.012)
Pleasure t-2 -0.011 0.030* -0.020 0.009 -0.004 0.027**
(0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.008) (0.011)
Pleasure t-3 -0.012 0.022 0.006 0.0320* -0.013 0.018
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.009) (0.012)
Pleasure t-4 -0.001 0.016 -0.005 0.024 -0.002 0.018*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010)
Pleasure t-5 -0.010 0.012 -0.0226* 0.014 -0.007 0.021*
(0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011)
Observations 7926 7926 7919 7919 7837 7837
Nr of Individuals 178 178 178 178 178 178
R-squared 0.21 0.47 0.26 0.48 0.37 0.57
Note: Individual fixed effects are included in all specifications. Columns (2) include individual-specific linear time 
trends and week-effects. All standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
Yes
Autoregressive Happiness Estimates - 52-Day Study
Contempt Happiness Positive Feelings
Individual-specific time
trends and week-effects
- Yes - Yes -
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Table 4B
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Dependent t-1 0.231*** -0.068*** 0.207*** -0.085*** 0.172*** -0.120***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022)
Dependent t-2 0.128*** -0.084*** 0.044*** -0.162*** 0.070*** -0.138***
(0.016) (0.021) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017)
Dependent t-3 0.045*** -0.132*** 0.017 -0.165*** 0.013 -0.157***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Dependent t-4 0.043*** -0.114*** 0.031** -0.122*** 0.001 -0.152***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Dependent t-5 0.035** -0.111*** 0.009 -0.120*** 0.021* -0.112***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015)
Social Satisfaction t 0.142*** 0.131*** -0.202*** -0.204*** -0.147*** -0.150***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013)
Social Satisfaction t-1 -0.013 0.025** 0.000 -0.062*** 0.013 -0.037***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
Social Satisfaction t-2 -0.009 0.021* 0.009 -0.044*** -0.001 -0.041***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011)
Social Satisfaction t-3 -0.016 0.014 0.008 -0.041*** -0.004 -0.042***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011)
Social Satisfaction t-4 -0.006 0.016 0.009 -0.036*** 0.011 -0.024**
(0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012)
Social Satisfaction t-5 -0.018** 0.004 0.008 -0.026** 0.000 -0.025***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009)
Pleasure t 0.086*** 0.086*** -0.065*** -0.055*** -0.037*** -0.034***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
Pleasure t-1 -0.001 0.022 0.018 0.004 0.014 -0.001
(0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.013)
Pleasure t-2 0.014 0.039** 0.000 -0.014 0.007 -0.006
(0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015)
Pleasure t-3 -0.004 0.0268* -0.014 -0.030** -0.002 -0.014
(0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012)
Pleasure t-4 0.013 0.036** 0.003 -0.011 -0.001 -0.006
(0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.008) (0.011)
Pleasure t-5 -0.005 0.027 0.019* 0.001 0.011 0.005
(0.012) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Observations 7930 7930 7919 7919 7837 7837
Nr of Individuals 178 178 178 178 178 178
R-squared 0.18 0.43 0.26 0.48 0.37 0.57
Note: Individual fixed effects are included in all specifications. Columns (2) include individual-specific linear time 
trends and week-effects. All standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
Yes
Autoregressive Happiness Estimates - 52-Day Study
Pride Unhappiness Sadness
Individual-specific time
trends and week-
- Yes - Yes -
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Appendix 1: Data description 
German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) 
The GSOEP is a longitudinal data set which is representative of the German 
population. It began randomly sampling households for the west states of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1984. The original sample size was around 6000 households yielding 
a sample of above 12,000 individuals. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Germany was 
reunited and the sample was expanded to represent Germany as a whole.  For more detailed 
information on the history of the GSOEP please refer to Wagner et al. (2007). 
Due to the empirical nature of this work we use the original sample (West Germany 
only) covering the years 1984 to 2005 in order to maximize panel length.1
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
 This results in an 
average of 9 waves per respondent. Our dependant variable (happiness) is defined as the 
individual’s overall life satisfaction. In the survey, this question is only responded by 
individuals age 16 and over. Our variable for household income is taken from the Cross-
National Equivalent File (1984-2005) where it is defined as “Real Household Post-
Government Income”. This variable corresponds to total household income (i.e. labor 
income, pensions, etc.) after taxes and other transfers (combines payments of all household 
members). Data on CPI was taken from OECD.  
The BHPS is a random representative sample of the population of the United 
Kingdom. It began in 1991 surveying some 5,500 households and additional household were 
incorporated in 1999 and 2001 yielding a sample of over 10,000 household containing over 
24,000 individuals aged 15 onwards. Individuals who left their original household to form a 
new one were followed and all adults were consequentially interviewed. We make use of 
data from wave 6 to 15 due to the fact that questions on life satisfaction were introduced as of 
wave 6. 
In wave 11 the question on life satisfaction was dropped from the survey because 
space constraints in Self Completion Schedule, and replaced by the Quality of Life module 
1 For instance, Di Tella et al. (2007) undertake the same strategy. Results are robust to including whole sample. 
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(introduced every 5 years). Data for wave 11 then has missing values for happiness. This 
yields a panel with a maximum length of 10 waves and a mean of 7 waves per respondent. 
Data on CPI was taken from the UK Office of National Statistics. 
Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 
Not widely used in Economics of Happiness literature, the SHP is a relatively new 
longitudinal data set which was started in 1999. It is surveyed annually covering more than 
5000 representative households, with a sample size of over 13000 respondents. All 
individuals over the age of 14 in the household are surveyed. In comparison to the BHPS or 
GSOEP, the SHP collects data on a wider variety of topics which are of interest in social 
science. For more information on the SHP refer to Budowski et al. (2001). 
 We use data covering waves 1 through 8 (1999 to 2006) with a mean of 5 waves per 
respondent. Questions on life satisfaction were included as of the year 2000. Data on CPI was 
taken from OECD.   
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Table A1
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. of Obs. 
Happiness (0 - 10 Scale) 7.052 1.822 0 10 N=118137
Between 1.428 0 10 n=13258
Within 1.292 -1.632 14.353 T (avg)= 8.9
Household Income (In Euros) 31621.2 17961.5 0 405045.4 N=125665
Between 15854.4 54.06642 278905.9 n=14015
Within 10361.6 -170819.9 240819.4 T= 8.9
Household Size 2.966 1.422 1 17 N=125665
Between 1.316 1 11 n=14015
Within 0.712 -4.034 11.216 T= 8.9
Days in Hospital 1.892 9.292 0 365 N=125665
Between 6.614 0 280 n=14015
Within 8.151 -88.108 321.267 T= 8.9
Full-time Employment 0.463 0.499 0 1 N=125665
Between 0.427 0 1 n=14015
Within 0.285 -0.487 1.413 T= 8.9
Not Employed 0.381 0.486 0 1 N=125665
Between 0.401 0 1 n=14015
Within 0.308 -0.569 1.331 T= 8.9
Marital Status: Married 0.672 0.469 0 1 N=125665
Between 0.448 0 1 n=14015
Within 0.219 -0.278 1.622 T= 8.9
Marital Status: Single 0.185 0.389 0 1 N=125665
Between 0.408 0 1 n=14015
Within 0.159 -0.765 1.135 T= 8.9
Registered Disabled 0.116 0.320 0 1 N=125665
Between 0.264 0 1 n=14015
Within 0.168 -0.834 1.066 T= 8.9
Summary Statistics for the GSOEP
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Table A2
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. of Obs. 
Happiness (0 - 10 Scale) 8.018 1.390 0 10 N=21454
Between 1.211 0 10 n=5232
Within 0.828 0.418 13.418 T (avg)= 4.3
Household Income (In Euros) 103327.3 68221.8 0 2142253 N=22538
Between 59889.9 4742.857 1280684 n=5314
Within 35040.8 -1017967 1320615 T= 4.2
Household Size 2.904 1.408 1 10 N=22538
Between 1.356 1 9 n=5314
Within 0.401 -2.896 7.104 T (avg)= 4.2
No. of Doctor Consultations 3.447 7.819 0 365 N=22538
Between 6.729 0 216 n=5314
Within 5.504 -164.6 287.6 T (avg)= 4.2
Full-time Employment 0.735 0.441 0 1 N=22538
Between 0.414 0 1 n=5314
Within 0.192 -0.122 1.592 T (avg)= 4.2
Unemployed 0.012 0.110 0 1 N=22538
Between 0.079 0 1 n=5314
Within 0.087 -0.738 0.869 T (avg)= 4.2
Marital Status: Married 0.651 0.477 0 1 N=22538
Between 0.471 0 1 n=5314
Within 0.125 -0.206 1.508 T (avg)= 4.2
Marital Status: Divorced 0.076 0.266 0 1 N=22538
Between 0.254 0 1 n=5314
Within 0.073 -0.781 0.934 T (avg)= 4.2
Summary Statistics for the SHP
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Table A3
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. of Obs. 
Happiness (0 - 7 Scale) 5.229 1.287 1 7 N=70956
Between 1.084 1 7 n=16265
Within 0.772 0.086 9.514 T (avg)= 4.4
Household Income (In GB Pounds) 28398.1 22833.5 0 1205210 N=70956
Between 19010.5 0 347694.2 n=16265
Within 13458.7 -305247.9 1012130 T (avg)= 4.4
Household Size 2.758 1.324 1 13 N=70956
Between 1.278 1 12.66667 n=16265
Within 0.489 -2.9 8.2 T (avg)= 4.4
Days in Hospital 0.905 5.785 0 280 N=70956
Between 4.148 0 104.5 n=16265
Within 4.524 -74.8 190.9 T (avg)= 4.4
Full-time Employment 0.527 0.499 0 1 N=70956
Between 0.450 0 1 n=16265
Within 0.234 -0.330 1.384 T (avg)= 4.4
Unemployed 0.027 0.163 0 1 N=70956
Between 0.125 0 1 n=16265
Within 0.121 -0.830 0.884 T (avg)= 4.4
Marital Status: Married 0.590 0.492 0 1 N=70956
Between 0.473 0 1 n=16265
Within 0.163 -0.267 1.447 T (avg)= 4.4
Marital Status: Divorced 0.086 0.280 0 1 N=70956
Between 0.263 0 1 n=16265
Within 0.104 -0.771 0.943 T (avg)= 4.4
Summary Statistics for the BHPS
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Table A4
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. of Obs. 
Happy (1 - 9 Scale) 4.194 1.476 1 9 N=9063
Between 1.051 1.365 6.942 n=180
Within 1.044 -0.518 9.194 T (avg)= 50.3
Social Satisfaction (1 - 10 Scale 6.535 1.570 1 10 N=9052
Between 0.975 2.891 8.731 n=180
Within 1.229 -0.330 11.977 T (avg)= 50.3
Daily Pleasure (1-7 Scales) 2.323 1.287 1 7 N=9067
Between 0.902 1.038 6 n=180
Within 0.975 -1.500 7.563 T (avg)= 50.3
Content (1 - 8 Scale) 3.955 1.598 1 8 N=9066
Between 1.200 1.288 6.981 n=180
Within 1.055 -1.929 9.205 T (avg)= 50.3
Sadness (1-8 Scale) 1.790 0.975 1 8 N=9058
Between 0.613 1.038 4.462 n=180
Within 0.774 -0.891 7.117 T (avg)= 50.3
Summary Statistics for 52-Day Study
43
Appendix 2: Data Definitions 
British Household Panel Survey 
Happiness / Satisfaction with Life: Individual 
response to question: "How satisfied or dissatisfied 
are you with your life overall?” [1 Not satisfied at all] 
- [7 Fully satisfied] 
Satisfaction with Household Income: Individual 
response to question: " How satisfied or dissatisfied 
are you with the income of your household?” [1 Not 
satisfied at all] - [7 Fully satisfied] 
Household Income: Household Gross Income 
deflated to prices of 2005 using information on CPI 
from UK Statistics. Including all income perceived by 
household: labor, transfers, welfare, etc. Income value 
is reported in GB Pounds. 
Equivalence corrected Income: elasticity to household 
size correction for income, using equivalence scale 
elasticity obtained by regressing variables against 
satisfaction with household income. 
No. of Serious Accidents: number of accidents which 
require medical treatment by a doctor or a hospital 
visit. 
Health Satisfaction: respondent’s answer to the 
question: “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your 
health?” [1 Not satisfied at all] - [7 Fully satisfied] 
Satisfaction with Social Life: respondent’s answer to 
the question: “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with 
your social life?” [1 Not satisfied at all] - [7 Fully 
satisfied] 
Control Variables: 
Household Composition variables: includes number 
of children, employed, retired individuals in 
household. 
Household Size: number of people in household. 
Employment state: set of dummies for different 
employment states derived from the following 
question: “Which best describes your current 
situation?” [1 Self Employed], [2 Paid Employment], 
[3 Unemployed], [4 Retired], [5 Maternity Leave], [6 
Looking After Family], [7 Attending Classes], [8 Sick 
or Disabled] and [9 Government Training]. Plus 
dummy for having a second job. 
Age: age in years derived from date of interview and 
individual responses to the question about the birth 
dates. 
Marital State: set of dummies (Married, Separated, 
Divorced, Widowed and Never Married) obtained 
from question: "What is your legal marital status? [1 
Married], [2 Separated, [3 Divorced], [4 Widowed] 
and [5 Never married] 
Education: set of dummy variables derived from 
individual responses to the question: "Which is the 
highest qualification he/she has got? [1 Training 
Certificate], [2 Trade Apprenticeship], …, [11 
University Diploma], …, [13 University Higher 
Degree]". 
Health State: a set of dummies on diverse health 
problems obtained from question: "Have any of the 
health problems listed on this card? (i.e. difficulty 
seeing, diabetes, breathing problems, etc.)" 
Smokes: a dummy variable derived from the 
individual responses to the question: "Do you smoke 
cigarettes? [1 Yes] [2 No]". 
No of Cigarettes: derived from question: “How many 
cigarettes did you smoke in the last 7 days?” 
Days in Hospital: number of days respondent spent 
in hospital derived from question: “Since (date), in all, 
how many days have you spent in a hospital or clinic 
as an in –patient?” 
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German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
Happiness / Satisfaction with Life: Individual 
response to question: "How satisfied are you with your 
life, all things considered?” [0 Completely Dissatisfied] - 
[10 Completely Satisfied] 
Satisfaction with Household Income: Individual 
response to question: “How satisfied are you with your 
household income?” [0 Completely Dissatisfied] – [10 
Completely Satisfied] 
Household Income: “Real Household Post-
Government Income” from the CNEF. It includes all 
income perceived by ALL household members (i.e. 
labor income, pensions, windfalls, etc.). Since all 
income data is reported as monthly average, the data 
has been annualized. Government tax burdens were 
estimated by the DIW using calculation routines 
developed by Schwarze. Values reported are in EURO 
deflated to prices of the year 2000 using data from the 
OECD. 
Equivalence corrected Income: elasticity to household 
size correction for income, using equivalence scale 
elasticity obtained by regressing variables against 
satisfaction with household income. 
Health Satisfaction: respondent’s answer to the 
question: “How satisfied are you with your health?” [0 
Completely Dissatisfied] - [10 Completely Satisfied] 
Satisfaction with Spare Time: respondent’s answer to 
the question: “How satisfied are you with your spare 
time?” [0 Completely Dissatisfied] - [10 Completely 
Satisfied] 
Control Variables: 
Household Composition variables: number of 
children, household size (number of individuals in 
household). 
Age: in years and age squared. 
Employment state: set of dummies for different 
employment states derived from a generated variable 
by the DIW using data on labor force participation 
and non-employment characteristics.  
Hours worked: annual. Constructed by DIW using 
information on employment status, average number 
of hours worked per week and the number of months 
worked in the previous year. No corrections for 
vacations were made. 
Marital State: set of dummies (Married, Separated, 
Divorced, Widowed, Single, Not living with a partner) 
derived from variable constructed in CNEF where 
categories indicate legal marital status. 
Education: number of years.  Variable constructed by 
assigning years according to type of education. For 
example: Individuals with a school leaving degree are 
assigned a minimum of between 9 and 12. 
Days Spent in Hospital: Individuals were asked: 
“How many nights in total did you spend in the hospital 
last year?”. Since this question was not included in the 
questionnaire for years 1990 and 1993, this control is 
not included in results presented in order to maximize 
panel length. Regardless, results are robust to 
including this variable. 
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Swiss Household Panel 
Happiness / Satisfaction with Life: Individual 
response to question: "In general, how satisfied are you 
with your life if 0 means “not at all satisfied” and 10 means 
“completely satisfied”?”  
Satisfaction with Household Income: Individual 
response to question: “Overall how satisfied are you with 
the financial situation of your household. If 0 means “not at 
all satisfied” and 10 “completely satisfied”?”  
Household Income: “Yearly Household Income, Net” 
variable constructed in the SHP. It includes all income 
perceived by ALL household members (i.e. labor 
income, pensions, windfalls, etc.) after deduction of 
social security contributions. Taxes not deducted. 
Values reported are in EURO deflated to prices of the 
year 2000 using data from the OECD. 
Equivalence corrected Income: elasticity to household 
size correction for income, using equivalence scale 
elasticity obtained by regressing variables against 
satisfaction with household income. 
Robbed: respondent’s answer to “Since [last interview] 
with your household, was your accommodation (house) 
burglured?” Yes or No. 
Health Satisfaction: respondent’s answer to “How 
satisfied are you with your state of health, if 0 means ‘not 
satisfied at all’ and 10 ‘completely satisfied’?” 
Free Time Satisfaction: respondent’s answer to “How 
satisfied are you with the amount of free time you have, if 0 
means ‘not satisfied at all’ and 10 ‘completely satisfied’?” 
 
Control Variables: 
Household Composition variables: number of 
children, household size (number of individuals in 
household). 
Age: in years and age squared. 
Hours worked: individual response the question: 
“How many hours do you usually work each week for your 
main job?” 
Employment State: set of dummies for different 
employment states derived from variable generated 
by SHP from diverse question on employment. 
Marital State: set of dummies (Married, Separated, 
Divorced, Widowed, Never Married) indicating actual 
civil status in year of interview. 
Education: set of dummy variables indicating 
respondent’s highest level of education achieved: 
ranging from incomplete compulsory school to 
university, higher specialized school. 
Health State: set of dummies indicating different 
health problems such as: back problems, 
weakness/weariness, sleeping problems, headaches, 
chronic illness or long-term health problem.  
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